


Compiled Nonlocal Games

Sum of Squares Optimization Meets Cryptography?

Anand Natarajan ¹ Tina Zhang arXiv:2303.01545

Nonlocal Games

Invented by John Bell to test
quantum mechanics

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quantum mechanics

Referee (classical)



Alice




Bob

Nonlocal Games


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Referee (classical)



Nonlocal Games

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


$$P_{\min} = \Pr_{i,j \in \{a,b\}}$$

Answers
 a, b are
"correct"
for questions
 i, j

Nonlocal Games

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quantum mechanics




$$P_{\text{win}} = \Pr_{i,j}^{\text{ani}, \text{bri}}$$

Answers
 a_j, b_i are
"correct"
for questions
 i, j

In general

$$P_{\text{win}}^{\text{classical}} \leq P_{\text{win}}^{\text{quantum}}$$

The CHSH Game




$$i, j \in \{0, 1\}$$

$$a, b \in \{\pm 1\}$$

Win if $ab = (-1)^{s_{ij}}$

i	j	$ab = ?$	s_{ij}
0	0	+1	0
0	1	+1	0
1	0	+1	0
1	1	-1	-1


The CHSH Game




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
The CHSH Game




$$P_{\text{win}} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \beta$$

$$\beta^{\text{classical}} = \max_{i,j} E^{(-)}(s_{ij}) a_i b_j$$

st. $\forall i \quad a_i^2 = 1$
 $\forall j \quad b_j^2 = 1$



The CHSH Game




$$P_{\text{win}} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \beta$$

$$\beta^{\text{classical}} = \max_{i,j} E^{(-)}(s_{ij}) a_i b_j$$

S.t. $\forall i \quad a_i^2 = 1$

$\forall j \quad b_j^2 = 1$





$$\beta^{\text{classical}} = \frac{1}{2}$$

Set $a_0 = a_1 = 1$
 $b_0 = b_1 = -1$

$\Rightarrow P_{\text{win}}^{\text{classical}} = 3/4$

The CHSH Game



$$P_{\text{win}} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \beta$$

quantum

$$\beta = \max_{A_i, B_j, P} E^{(-)}_{i,j} + [A_i, B_j, P]$$

matrices!


s.t. $P \leq 0, +P = 1$

$$A_i, A_i^2 = I$$

$$B_j, B_j^2 = I$$

$$A_{ij}, A_i B_j = B_j A_i$$

The CHSH Game




$$P_{\text{win}} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \beta$$

quantum

$$\beta = \max_{A_i, B_j, P} E^{(-)}_{i,j} + [A_i, B_j, P]$$

S.t. $P \leq 0, +P = 1$



quantum

$$\beta = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \sqrt{2}$$


$\beta > \beta^{\text{classical}}$

$$A_i, A_i^2 = I$$

$$B_j, B_j^2 = I$$

$$A_{ij}, A_i B_j = B_j A_i$$

The CHSH Game




$$P_{\text{win}} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \beta$$

quantum

$$\beta = \max_{A_i, B_j, P} E^{(-)}_{i,j} + [A_i, B_j, P]$$

s.t. $P \leq 0, +P = 1$



quantum

$$\beta = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \sqrt{2}$$

$P_{\text{win}}^{\text{quantum}} \approx 0.85 > \frac{3}{4}$

$$A_i, A_i^2 = I$$

$$B_j, B_j^2 = I$$

$$A_{ij}, A_i B_j = B_j A_i$$

The CHSH Game

- $P_{\text{win}}^{\text{quantum}} > P_{\text{win}}^{\text{classical}}$ demonstrated in lab [2022 Nobel Prize!]
- Q. optimizer is "rigid"

$$\beta^Q(A, B) \approx \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{2} \Rightarrow A_0, A_1, A_0 \\ B_0, B_1, \approx -B_1, B_0$$

Anticommutation \Rightarrow "complementary measurements"
in physics

The CHSH Game

, Q. optimizer is "rigid"

$$\beta^Q(A, B) \approx \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{2} \Rightarrow A_0 A_1 \approx -A_1 A_0 \\ B_0 B_1 \approx -B_1 B_0$$

Anticommutation \Rightarrow "complementary measurements" in physics

\Rightarrow Using CHSH, can build protocols to test quantum computers "gate by gate" [RUV'13]


Drawbacks of nonlocal games

Drawbacks of nonlocal games

- Non-communication between players is essential

a must only depend on i

b must only depend on j




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
Quantum: A_i and B_j must be commuting matrices

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
Quantum: A_i and B_j must be commuting matrices

Experimentally very difficult to realize!

Cryptographic Compilers


- Idea: Use cryptography so one player can "simulate" 2 separated players

[Long history in crypto, e.g.
Kilian '92, Bmv'98, KRR'14,]





Cryptographic Compilers

- Idea: Use cryptography so one player can "simulate" 2 separated players





Cryptographic Compilers



[KLVY'22]: $P_{\text{win}}^{\text{classical, compiled}} \leq P_{\text{win}}^{\text{classical, nonlocal}} + \text{negl.}$

Cryptographic Compilers




$$[\text{KLVY'22}]: P_{\text{win}}^{\text{coupled}} \stackrel{???}{=} P_{\text{win}}^{\text{nonlocal}} + \text{negl. } ???$$

Quantum
Quantum
nonlocal

Cryptographic

Compilers : CHSH



	classical	quantum
nonlocal	$\frac{3}{4}$	$0.85 \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\sqrt{2}}{4}\right)$
compiled	$\frac{3}{4} + \text{neg!}$????? (is it even < 1?)

Our results

	classical	quantum
nonlocal	$\frac{3}{4}$	$0.85 \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\sqrt{2}}{4}\right)$
compiled	$\frac{3}{4} + \text{neg!}$	$0.85 + \text{neg!}$ $\left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\sqrt{2}}{4} + \text{neg!}\right)$


Our results : rigidity

	classical	quantum
nonlocal	$\frac{3}{4}$	$0.85 \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\sqrt{2}}{4} \right)$
compiled	$\frac{3}{4} + \text{negl!}$	$0.85 + \text{negl!}$ $\left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\sqrt{2}}{4} + \text{negl!} \right)$

Any strategy
that is
near optimal

must have

$$B_0 B_1 \approx -B_1 B_0$$




Our results : delegation

	classical	quantum
nonlocal	$\frac{3}{4}$	$0.85 \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\sqrt{2}}{4}\right)$
compiled	$\frac{3}{4} + \text{negl}$	$0.85 + \text{negl}$ $\left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\sqrt{2}}{4} + \text{negl}\right)$



A delegation scheme for poly-time quantum computation w/ classical client

(assuming quantum fully homomorphic encryption
 \Leftarrow LWE [Mahadev '17])




Our results : delegation

	classical	quantum
nonlocal	$\frac{3}{4}$	$0.85 \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\sqrt{2}}{4}\right)$
compiled	$\frac{3}{4} + \text{negl}$	$0.85 + \text{negl}$ $\left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\sqrt{2}}{4} + \text{negl}\right)$



A delegation scheme for poly-time quantum computation w/ classical client

(assuming quantum fully homomorphic encryption
 ↵ LWE [Mahadev '17])



Matches [Mahadev '18]
 by new techniques

Techniques: outline

1) Prove $\beta^Q \leq \frac{1}{2} \cdot \sqrt{2}$ in nonlocal world using

noncommutative Sum-of-Squares

2) Modify this proof to show

$$\beta_{\text{compiled}}^Q \leq \frac{1}{2} \cdot \sqrt{2} + \text{negl.}$$

SoS for β^Q $\hat{G}(A_0, A_1, B_0, B_1)$

$$\beta^Q = \max \text{tr} \left[\underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{i,j} (-i)^{s_{ij}}}_{A_i \quad B_j} \begin{matrix} A_i & B_j & \rho \end{matrix} \right]$$

s.t. $A_i^2 = B_j^2 = I, \quad A_i B_j = B_j A_i$

$$\rho \geq 0, \quad \text{tr} \rho = 1$$

SOS for β^Q $\hat{G}(A_0, A_1, B_0, B_1)$

$$\beta^Q = \max \text{tr} \left[\underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{i,j} (-i)^{s_{ij}}}_{A_i \quad B_j} \begin{matrix} A_i & B_j & \rho \end{matrix} \right]$$

s.t. $A_i^2 = B_j^2 = I, A_i B_j = B_j A_i \quad (*)$

$$\rho \geq 0, \text{tr } \rho = 1$$

To show $\beta^Q \leq \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{2}$, suffices to show

$$\frac{1}{2}\sqrt{2} - \hat{G} \geq 0 \quad \text{whenever } (*) \text{ holds}$$

SOS for β^Q

To show $\beta^Q \leq \frac{1}{2} \cdot \sqrt{2}$

suffices to show

$$\frac{1}{2} \cdot \sqrt{2} - \hat{G} \geq 0 \quad \Leftarrow (*)$$



$$\frac{1}{2} \cdot \sqrt{2} - \hat{G}(A, B) = \sum_k p_k^{(A, B)} p_k^{(A, B)} \text{ mod } (*)$$

Sum of squares (must be ≥ 0)

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \beta^Q = \max \quad \text{tr} \left[\overbrace{\prod_{i,j} (-1)^{s_{ij}} A_i B_j}^{\hat{G}(A_0, A_1, B_0, B_1)} P \right] \\
 & \text{s.t.} \quad A_i^2 = B_i^2 = I, \quad A_i B_j = B_j A_i \quad (*) \\
 & \quad P \geq 0, \quad \text{tr} P = 1
 \end{aligned}$$

SOS for β^Q

To show $\beta^Q \leq \frac{1}{2} \cdot \sqrt{2}$

suffices to show

$$\begin{aligned} \beta^Q &= \max_{\substack{\text{s.t.} \\ \rho \geq 0, \text{ tr } \rho = 1}} \text{tr} \left[\sum_{i,j} (-1)^{s_{ij}} A_i B_j \rho \right] \\ &\quad \text{st. } A_i^2 = B_j^2 = I, A_i B_j = B_j A_i \quad (*) \end{aligned}$$

$$\frac{1}{2} \cdot \sqrt{2} - \hat{G}(A, B) = \sum_k P_k^{(A, B)} P_k^{(A, B)} \text{ mod } (*)$$

$$\text{Take } P_1 \propto \left(A_0 - \frac{B_0 + B_1}{\sqrt{2}} \right)$$

$$P_2 \propto \left(A_1 - \frac{B_0 - B_1}{\sqrt{2}} \right)$$

SOS for β^Q

To show $\beta^Q \leq \frac{1}{2} \cdot \sqrt{2}$

suffices to show

$$\begin{aligned} \beta^Q &= \max_{\rho} \operatorname{tr} \left[\overbrace{\prod_{i,j} (-1)^{s_{ij}} A_i B_j}^{G(A_0, A_1, B_0, B_1)} \rho \right] \\ \text{s.t. } &A_i^2 = B_j^2 = I, \quad A_i B_j = B_j A_i \quad (*) \\ &\rho \geq 0, \quad \operatorname{tr} \rho = 1 \end{aligned}$$

$$\frac{1}{2} \cdot \sqrt{2} - \hat{G}(A, B) = \sum_k p_k (A, B)^+ p_k (A, B) \bmod (*)$$

Take $p_1 \propto \left(A_0 - \frac{B_0 + B_1}{\sqrt{2}} \right)$

$p_2 \propto \left(A_1 - \frac{B_0 - B_1}{\sqrt{2}} \right)$

\Rightarrow rigidity
(near optimal strategies have $p_k \approx 0$)

SoS for $\beta_{\text{compiled}}^Q$

$$\beta_{\text{compiled}}^Q = \max \text{tr} \left[\sum_a \prod_{i,j} (-1)^{s_{ij}} A_i^{(a)} B_j \cdot A_i^{(a)} \rho \right]$$

s.t.

$$\forall i, \sum_a A_i^{(a)T} A_i^{(a)} = I$$

$$\forall j \quad B_j^2 = I$$

$$\rho \geq 0, \text{tr} \rho = 1$$

SOS for $\beta_{\text{compiled}}^Q$ sequential quantum measurement

$$\beta_{\text{compiled}}^Q = \max \text{tr} \left[\sum_a \prod_{i,j} (-i)^{s_{ij}} A_i^{(a)} B_j A_i^{(a)} \rho \right]$$

s.t.

$$\forall i, \sum_a A_i^{(a)\dagger} A_i^{(a)} = I$$

$$\forall j, B_j^2 = I$$

$$\rho \geq 0, \text{tr} \rho = 1$$

SoS for $\beta^Q_{\text{compiled}}$

$$\beta^Q_{\text{compiled}} = \max \operatorname{tr} \left[\sum_a \mathbb{E}_{i,j} (-1)^{s_{ij}} A_i^{(a)} B_j \cdot A_i^{(a)} \rho \right]$$

s.t.

$$\forall i, \sum_a A_i^{(a)\dagger} A_i^{(a)} = I$$

$$\forall j, B_j^2 = I$$

$$\boxed{\forall i, \forall \text{"efficient" } f(B) \quad \operatorname{tr} \left[\sum_a A_i^{(a)} f(B) A_i^{(a)\dagger} \rho \right] x_{reg}}$$

$$\rho \geq 0, \operatorname{tr} \rho = 1$$

$$\boxed{\operatorname{tr} \left[\sum_a A_i^{(a)\dagger} f(B) A_i^{(a)} \rho \right]}$$

SoS for $\beta_{\text{compiled}}^Q$

$$\beta_{\text{compiled}}^Q = \max \operatorname{tr} \left[\sum_a \prod_{i,j} (-1)^{s_{ij}} A_i^{(a)} B_j \cdot A_i^{(a)} \rho \right]$$

s.t.

$$\forall i, \sum_a A_i^{(a)\dagger} A_i^{(a)} = I$$

$$\forall j, B_j^2 = I$$

from
Cryptography

replaces

$\forall_{i,j}, \forall \text{"efficient" } f(B)$

$$\operatorname{tr} \left[\sum_a A_i^{(a)} f(B) A_i^{(a)\dagger} \rho \right] \geq 0$$

$$A_i^\dagger B_j = B_j A_i$$

$$\rho \geq 0, \operatorname{tr} \rho = 1$$

$$\operatorname{tr} \left[\sum_a A_i^{(a)} f(B) A_i^{(a)\dagger} \rho \right]$$


SoS for β^Q compiled

$$\beta_{\text{compiled}}^Q = \max \operatorname{tr} \left[\sum_a \mathbb{E}_{i,j} (-1)^{s_{ij}} A_i^{(a)} B_j A_i^{(a)} \rho \right]$$

s.t.

$$\forall i, \sum_a A_i^{(a)\dagger} A_i^{(a)} = I$$

$$\forall j, B_j^2 = I$$



"No measurement in round 2 can leak info about i (since it is encrypted)"

$$\boxed{\forall i, \forall \text{"efficient" } f(B) \operatorname{tr} [\sum_a A_i^{(a)} f(B) A_i^{(a)} \rho] \geq_{negl}}$$

$$\rho \geq 0, \operatorname{tr} \rho = 1$$

$$\operatorname{tr} [\sum_a A_i^{(a)\dagger} f(B) A_i^{(a)} \rho]$$

SoS for $\beta_{\text{compiled}}^Q$

$$\beta_{\text{compiled}}^Q = \max \operatorname{tr} \left[\sum_a \prod_{i,j} (-1)^{s_{ij}} A_i^{(a)} B_j A_j^{(a)} \rho \right]$$

$\overbrace{\quad \quad \quad}^{\tilde{G}_{\text{compiled}}}$

s.t.

$$\forall i, \sum_a A_i^{(a)\dagger} A_i^{(a)} = I$$

$$\forall j, B_j^2 = I$$

$$\forall i, \forall \text{"efficient" } f(B) \quad \operatorname{tr} [\sum_a A_i^{(a)} f(B) A_i^{(a)} \rho] \gtrsim_{\text{negl}} \quad \left. \begin{array}{c} \\ \\ \end{array} \right\} (**)$$

$$\rho \geq 0, \operatorname{tr} \rho = 1$$

$$\operatorname{tr} [\sum_a A_i^{(a)} f(B) A_i^{(a)} \rho]$$

(can we show

$$\frac{1}{2} \cdot \sqrt{2} - \tilde{G}_{\text{compiled}}$$

$$= \sum \rho^+ \rho^-$$

mod $(\# \#)$?

SOS for $\beta_{\text{compiled}}^Q$

$$\beta_{\text{compiled}}^Q = \max \operatorname{tr} \left[\sum_a \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{i,j} (-1)^{s_{ij}} A_i^{(a)} B_j A_i^{(a)}}_{\tilde{G}_{\text{compiled}}} P \right]$$

s.t.

$$\forall i, \sum_a A_i^{(a)T} A_i^{(a)} = I$$

$$\forall j, B_j^2 = I$$

$$\forall i, \forall \text{"efficient" } f(B) \quad \operatorname{tr} \left[\sum_a A_i^{(a)} f(B) A_i^{(a)} P \right] \geq 0 \quad \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \\ \\ \end{array} \right. \quad (**)$$

$$P \geq 0, \operatorname{tr} P = 1$$

$$\operatorname{tr} \left[\sum_a A_i^{(a)} f(B) A_i^{(a)} P \right]$$

We show

$$\operatorname{tr} \left[\left(\frac{1}{2} \cdot \tilde{G}_{\text{compiled}} \right) P \right]$$

$$= \operatorname{tr} \left[\sum P^+ P^- P \right]$$

mod (* *)

which is sufficient !

Open questions

- What about other games?

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- Our SoS manipulations are very specific to CHSH
 - can we "lift" all simple SoS proofs (e.g. degree-2 proofs) ?
- Can the cryptographic requirements be relaxed ? (Less than full QFHE?)

Open questions

- Does quantum crypto give rise to interesting new non-commutative polynomial optimization problems?

Thank you!

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